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BORDERLAND MIMICRY:
IMPERIAL LEGACIES, NATIONAL STANDS 
AND REGIONAL IDENTITY IN CROATIAN
ISTRIA AFTER THE NINETIES
Imperial legacies have a twofold nature: they can be used for supporting ethno-
national identi cation but also for emphasising locally based narratives of hybrid 
identities and multiple attachments. The main hypothesis is that this twofold nature 
of imperial legacies emerges in the context of a problematic relation between 
nationality and citizenship. The hypothesis is examined in the context of the activa-
tion of the discourses of imperial legacies at the local level – in Croatian Istria in 
the 1990s – when they were employed as a counter-narrative to social and cultural 
homogenization which was propagated by the Croatian government.
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Mi identi co con la frontiera
Fulvio Tomizza1
Nation-building processes often exploit discourses of imperial legacies and, not 
surprisingly, by the nineties onwards it was often the case in South Eastern Europe. 
Such legacies – the Venetian, the Habsburg and the Ottoman ones – were gene-
rally used by the local elites to reinforce the con icts between different nationalist 
ideologies, which were pictured like con icts of civilization. However, imperial 
legacies also convey narratives of hybrid identities, everyday life coexistence and 
multiple belonging. It is less acknowledged that these narratives were sometimes 
activated at the local level to contrast the disrupting effect of nationalist trend of 
1 “I impersonate the frontier”; the late Fulvio Tomizza was one the most relevant writers in 
contemporary Istria.
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social and cultural homogenization (Richardson 2008; Laven and Baycroft 2008; 
Driessen 2005; Bufon and Minghi 2000).
According to the foregone, the main hypothesis of this paper is that the twofold 
nature of imperial legacies, both supporting ethno-national identi cation and lo-
cal patterns of territorial identi cation, emerges in the context of a problematic 
relation between nationality and citizenship. Such relation can be found in many 
areas of Europe’s “Eastern peripheries” (Schwara 2003; Green 2007) but it is a 
quite relevant issue in the newly born South Eastern European states. This dif cult 
relation, which is extremely evident in the Croatian region of Istria, includes a 
number of con icting approaches to nationality that promote social inclusion or 
exclusion of state citizens on the base of a scale of ethnicity – basically, being 
more or less “national” – which is reinforced by territorial, ideological, gender, 
religious and ethnic divides (Cocco 2007).
In the case of Istria, a multi-ethnic frontier region situated at the periphery 
of the Croatian state, I believe that the inconsistencies between nationality and 
citizenship also engender a strong spatial tension between the dimension of na-
tional identity – involving ethno-cultural contents – and the one of state identity 
– involving territorial and institutional elements – which are rarely coincident in 
areas where the nation-state is a latecomer (Kaplan 1994). While state identity 
involves membership in a polity and the citizenship that comes from the integra-
tion in the juridical system, the spatial dimension of national identity is sometimes 
emotionally deeper and usually more ambiguous; it includes the “primordial atta-
chment to the land” (Grosby 1995) and a “discursive landscape” (Häkli 1994), 
which are embedded in the culture of the collective memory of the people: the 
“territorialized memory” in Smith’s words (Smith 1996). As a result, people living 
in peripheral regions like Istria, where central institutions are weaker and there 
are in uences across political boundaries from neighbouring states, often grow a 
borderland identity that lives together with the state identity and the national one 
in a context of ambivalence and hybridism. Then, especially if minorities inhabit 
this space, the borderland identity can be institutionalized at the sub-state level 
through calls for regional autonomy (Paasi 1996) that can endanger state efforts to 
secure ideologically and culturally its borders.
Therefore, in our case the spatial tension between cultural and territorial ele-
ments set the stage for a political confrontation that has been seen between the 
Istrian regionalist movement on the one side and the state promoted Croatian 
nationalism on the other one. Both opponents of such a national-regional con ict 
largely exploit the ambivalent nature of imperial legacies for achieving their 
speci c goals.
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The Imperial Frontier and Its Politics of Identity
Historically, the area of Central and South Eastern Europe has represented an 
exceptional stage for a number of cultural and political engagements aimed at two 
oppositional goals: on the one hand, to separate intermixed social groups and, on 
the other, to realize some forms of coexistence through the uni cation of distinct 
cultural realms, which are generally perceived as adversary. According to Stefano 
Bianchini, the result of such processes is a social complexity that gives rise to a 
regional “speci city” (Bianchini 1993:365–366; see also Prevélakis 1997; Todo-
rova 1997; Wolff 1994); the latter does not refer to the explosive incompatibility of 
cultures and their forced cohabitation – cherished by many nationalist ideologies 
– but rather to the contemporary sense of belonging that every single individual 
and all groups of the region feel with regard to two separate macro-communities. 
One is the ethnic group, which expresses the convergence of language, culture 
and frequently religion as a speci city of a people; the other is the supra-national 
belonging to large cultural frames, which implies sharing common traditions, life-
styles, everyday practices and special relations with the territory The last commu-
nity is somehow transversal to the  rst; it intertwines with the ethnic group in 
many ways, producing different combinations between the multiple dimensions 
of identity that delineate the cultural space of the area. Therefore, all re ections 
on the sense of belonging in South Eastern Europe should consider the multiple 
dimension of this cultural space where the ethnic dimension is only a convergence 
of some dimensions of identity, which nevertheless crosscut and spill over the 
rigid ethnic border.
After this suggestion, the idea of “frontier” appears as an useful conceptual 
tool to interpret the regional “speci city”, to approach the topic of the politics of 
identity in South Eastern Europe and, more speci cally, in former Yugoslavia. The 
post-communist scenario of former Yugoslavia presents a large differentiation of 
division lines and fronts of con ict, which have permeated the whole society and 
that still hold a grip on people’s mind. In this perspective, beyond a simpli ed 
reading of the con icts in the nineties that would reduce everything to a clash 
between antagonist peoples, a more critical observation points out that a number 
of strains existed in Yugoslav society and these are still a factor of instability in 
post-Yugoslav states. For example, from the point of view of everyday life or 
from the one of local communities, it comes out quite clearly that other con icting 
aspects of identity like the territorial ones were sometimes far more relevant for 
the people than the ethnic one. Accordingly, Noel Malcolm criticizes the approach 
that searched for original and authentic ethnic roots of the disputes in Kosovo 
between Serbs and Albanians, in spite of the fact that today many of the Serbs and 
Albanians living in Kosovo share the same primordial and pre-political convictions 
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(Malcolm 1998:xxvii). Also Ger Duijzings, writing on the politics of identity in 
Kosovo (Dujizings 2000:1–2), deconstructs the typical image of a fragmented and 
ethnically divided society and casts a light on many cultural features still shared 
across ethnic boundaries, thus proving that ethnic as well as religious barriers are 
not so much closed to external in uences. So, trade, cross-cultural in uences, 
religious exchanges and practices of conversions are all indexes of a considerable 
“trans-border movement” across social divisions that are today perceived as time-
less but in fact reveal a long coexistence of ethnic groups. Therefore, according to 
Dujizings, instead of two different ethnic societies it would be better to talk of a 
single frontier society where contacts and cooperation across ethnic and religious 
boundaries were intermingled with  ghts and clashes; thus, territorial and cogni-
tive borders could appear and dissolve depending on the political stability of the 
region.
Actually, the idea of imagining a frontier society is not really a new one and 
should not be romanticized either; many studies pointed out the alternation of 
coexistence and con icts, of cultural symbiosis and religious hostility in the 
South Eastern European region, which progressively emerged as an ethnically 
not homogeneous territory, geographically far from the real centers of power and 
in a prolonged state of warfare (Mandi  1995:34; Janigro 1993:67–68; Zanini 
1997:108). In these lands, people had to learn how to deal with the everyday 
life implications of a semi-permanent religious, cultural and even military con-
frontation, in a context where the three great religious Mediterranean traditions 
– the Roman Catholicism, the Eastern Orthodoxy and the Sunni Islam – met and 
clashed (Banac 1984:59). In other words, the idea of the “frontier”, with special 
regards to the Balkans, is almost always associated with the threat of the complete 
destruction of small and isolated communities living side by side in places were 
cultural homogeneity was traditionally weak and crises were very frequent. A 
classic example is Bosnia-Herzegovina (Fouad-Allam 1995:88–92).
Wendy Bracewell has explored this topic in her work on piracy in the Adriatic. 
The author discussed accurately the practices of cooperation and con icts of the 
“Uskoks of Senj” that were acting in an area characterized by permanent politi-
cal instability and continuous military-religious  ghts (Bracewell 1992). In such 
conditions, loyalty and allegiances frequently shifted from one side to the other of 
the imperial and religious border in spite of the attempts of the central authorities 
to draw accurate borders. The most famous of such attempts is the institutiona-
lization by the Habsburgs of the military frontier (Vojna krajina – Militärgrenze) 
(Rothenberg 1966).
Some of these assumptions over the contestation and the permeability of the 
borders in frontier areas have strong correspondences in studies on other frontier 
areas of the world, as the works of Donnan and Wilson have largely shown. It seems 
that in frontier areas the border engenders a multiplication and a transformation of 
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the patterns of identity: the national one but also the religious, the linguistic and 
the gender ones (Donnan and Wilson 1999). Thus, the border would act more as 
a space of everyday interaction and exchange rather than a permanent division 
line; like in the Spanish enclave of Melilla, in Morocco (Driessen 1992). This 
concept has been further developed by Remotti in his essay “against the identity”, 
which stands for a relational and situational comprehension of the identity divides 
(Remotti 2001).
So, rather than in ethnic or national terms, the dynamics of con ict in a frontier 
society have to be led back to the conditions of insecurity and violence that over-
come all group divisions, creating a sort of existential instability for everyone; to 
borrow the expression of the geographer Michel Roux, every frontier society is a: 
“véritable périphérie de la périphérie” (Roux 1992:238) where the everyday  ght 
for survival is made harsher by the continuous antagonism promoted by distant 
political centers. Consequently, if one looks for ethnicity one can eventually  nd 
it and in this way contribute to its construction (Eriksen 1993:21), but nonethe-
less, it is important to remind that this is only one among possible organizations 
of group difference through speci c combinations of many symbolic dimensions 
(Giordano 2000:75; Kodilja 1999:239). Therefore, among other types of identity 
there are territorial identities, and speci cally the local and regional ones, which 
are forms of organization of social difference alternative to the ethnic one but not 
less relevant.
Moreover, the conditions of existential instability set the stage for practices of 
mimicry and dissimulation, which represent strategies of self-protection and sur-
vival in contexts that show scarcity of resources and strong relations of dominance 
and subordination (Barnes 1994; Romania 2003; Swidler 1986). Consequently, 
the facts of lying, changing allegiance and converting can be explained in terms 
of strategies of preservation based on the necessity to maintain low pro le and to 
show loyalty to the political authority and thus to secure normal existence. In this 
perspective, among the inhabitants of frontier society there is the awareness that 
identities are not stable or given once for good, but they re ect somehow the lack 
of authenticity imposed from the center over its peripheries (Triolo 1998:200; 
Ashcroft, Grif ths and Ti n 1995); they are often considered as “masks” that can 
be accepted or contested depending on political conditions (Taussig 1993; Poulton 
1995).
At the same time, the modern state has to build a governable social and terri-
torial space and needs to precise the parameters of ethnic identity in order to 
include and exclude people subject to its authority (Verdery 1994:45). In former 
Yugoslavia, the successor states often acted to simplify the ethnic lines of inclu-
sion and exclusion in order to achieve the necessary consent, thus forcing the 
complexity of the territory to bring clarity within its structure (Scott 1990; Hall 
1994; Schöp in 2000:35). However, such desire brings about the possibility of 
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new forms of dissent and instability because the dream of a primordial ethnic 
identity clashes with the practices of mimicry and dissimulation that characterize 
the social space, so that it can introduce new forms of inequality.
“On the Right Side”: Croatian Nationalism after 1990
From 1990 to the year 2000, Croatia has undergone a controversial period char-
acterized by a cruel war, harsh social con icts, the slow growth of a deteriorated 
economy and the international isolation of the country, due to the bad human rights 
record (Pavkovi  1997; Tomac 1993; Goldstein 1999; Tanner 1997; Bilandži  
1999). At the same time, Croatia has consolidated its political independence and 
its territorial sovereignty under the leadership of the president Franjo Tu man. 
The latter has been something more than an authoritarian ruler because his rule 
deeply shaped the nation-state building process and somehow founded the bases 
of the national political discourse, understood as the collection of representations 
and dominant practices (Ballinger 1996).
The instrumental use of the Imperial memories of the Habsburg period of 
Croatian history is an important part of this political discourse. In these memories, 
the sense of cultural and historical belonging to the European realm, and more 
precisely to Central Europe, joins the myth of the antemurale of Christianity, 
which describes the Austro-Hungarian Croatia as the military and religious bul-
wark against the Islamic and Orthodox expansion in the West.
Moreover, the political independence brought about a spatial symbolic re-
orientation of the geopolitical balance of the country from Southeast to Northwest, 
a fact already observed in Slovenia (Paternost 1992). So, during the nineties many 
pro-European ideas were somehow biased by the anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslav 
feelings, and were weakened by the Croatian resentment towards the EU, whose 
lack of recognition for the Croatian sacri ces in defense of Europe (today as in the 
past) strengthened the isolation trends in the country.
On the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian cultural heritage and the myth of the 
Christian antemurale have been used to of cially represent Croatia as a Western 
European country, intrinsically and deeply connected to the West in every aspect 
of life. Already in 1981, Tu man wrote that since Medieval time, there was a 
national speci city in Croatia that survived and evolved in the political organiza-
tion of the Habsburg Empire. For him, within the Empire, Croatian
[w]as the only Slavic nation to be recognized as a kingdom, whose king was the 
Austrian Emperor; thus, the position of Croatia was on a higher level than that of 
Bohemia, Slovakia or other lands, even though such status meant submission to 
the Austrian and Hungarian power, the two ruling nations of the Empire (Bilandži  
1999:21).
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For Tu man, Croatia was situated in the heart of Europe, both politically and geo-
graphically; this strategic position explains the important role of the country for 
defending the European continent from its Eastern enemies. In Tu man’s words:
At the time of the Ottoman incursions in the heart of the Christian Europe, the plun-
dered and oppressed Croatia has been recognized as the antemurale of Christianity. 
Today, while defending freedom and democracy, Croatia remains the bulwark of 
European democracy against all the attempts of restoring a Communist regime 
(Bellamy 2000:8).
In this perspective, Tu man believed that the national differences were also mark-
ing the boundaries between two separate worlds: on one side, the European and 
civilized realm where Croatia belongs; on the other one, the barbarian Balkan 
marshland represented by Serbia. This frontier of civilizations is not only pertinent 
to the Austro-Hungarian kingdom but its origin can be traced back to the dawn of 
the Western history, at the ancient time of the clashes between the Mediterranean 
and Asiatic peoples. According to Tu man:
The Croats belong to a culture and a civilization, which are different from the ones 
of the Serbs. The Croats are part of Western Europe, of the Mediterranean tradition. 
Far long before Shakespeare and Molière our authors were translated into the most 
important European languages. The Serbs are part of the East. They are an Eastern 
people, like the Turks and the Albanians. They are part of the Byzantine world 
(Hayden and Bakic-Hayden 1992).
The Croatian political establishment has frequently portrayed the same Serbo-
Croatian war like a righteous reaction to the Serbian invasion of Croatia, in the 
wake of the ancient and typical struggle between the East and the West. For in-
stance, according to the Croatian art historian Željka orak:
This (the war) is an attack of the barbarians that came from the darkness to the light 
of the Mediterranean, until Rome. These barbarians that would like to consider 
themselves as the heirs of Byzantium or, even worse, real Byzantine people […] 
their behavior is eastern and different in the sense of a different ethic (MacDonald 
2000:75).
Similarly, for Croatian nationalism the sense of the con ict has never been the 
same for the two antagonist sides, for the Croats were never depicted as aggressors 
but always as victims, martyrs of the border,  ghters against the Eastern expan-
sionism of the Serbs. Therefore, the Croatian reaction was morally justi ed and 
was never put on the same level of the aggressor’s actions (MacDonald 2000:74). 
The Croatian nationalists utilised strategically Catholicism as an instrument of 
collective redemption and the moral absolution of the Croatian people. So, the 
conversion of the Croats to Catholicism symbolically signed the passage from the 
darkness to the light as a metaphor of the eternal  ght between the Good (West) 
and the Evil (East):
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After being baptized, the Croats swore on their honor and in the name of S. Peter 
the apostle that they will never conquer a foreign land or  ght a war against a for-
eign people, but they would live in peace with all good willing men. And they re-
ceived a special blessing from the Pope: if foreigners would ever attacked the land 
of the Croats and brought war, then God would  ght with the Croats, protecting 
them, and S. Peter would eventually bring the  nal victory (Lupi  1999:2).
In this mythological perspective, one can better understand the importance of the 
miracle of the Me ugorje Virgin, in Herzegovina, and its political and commercial 
promotion at the international level. The Virgin, which appeared for the  rst time 
in front of a group of children in 1981, is since then a world famous destination 
for Catholic pilgrims and many ordinary tourists. Interestingly enough, Tu man 
has been the  rst one that politically utilized the cult of the Virgin of Me ugorje 
in a peace conference, in May 1993 (MacDonald 2000:77). Thus, the nationalist 
politics exploited the mythical aspect of the cult, which can be described in terms 
of a territorial projection of the symbolic fracture between East and West in a 
frontier region. The Virgin became a sacred mark of the cultural frontier separa-
ting the Catholic and universalistic civilization of the Croats and the exclusivist 
dictatorship of the Serbs.
Territory and Regional Identity in Istria
If the Serbs tended to be identi ed with the enemy of Croatian nation, the “Istri-
ans” represented something more dubious: they were described by the nationalist 
voices as the prototype of the unreliable Croats, ethnically impure and politically 
not trustworthy. Sometimes, the unreliable character of the Istrians was explained 
by the HDZ (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica/Croatian Democratic Union) pre-
senting them as the victims of Serbo-communists, some other times the Istrians 
were depicted as Serbo-communists themselves. In all cases, the electoral defeats 
of the HDZ in Istria contributed to reinforce the doubts over this ethnically mixed 
periphery.2
By the nineties, on the other hand, the local public opinion of Istria grew the 
conviction that the Croatian government was carrying out a strategy to support the 
marginalization and the isolation of the region. Local media generally contributed 
to the establishment of this perception, suggesting that the new political center 
2 According to the 1991 census, made shortly after the Croatian declaration of independence, 
people in Istria identi ed themselves as Croats (57,7%), Italians (6,7%) Slovenes (1,6%) and as 
part of a number of minor nationalities of the former Yugoslavia and Central Europe (17,9%). 
Interestingly, 16,7% declared themselves as “Istrians”, while in 1981 regional identi cations reached 
only 1,7%. The percentage of people that declared themselves as Croats in 1981 was 72,2%, (77,8% 
in 1953) almost 14% more than in 1991. Somehow, it looks like as if many of the “new” Istrians of 
the 1991 used to declare themselves as Croats at the time of Yugoslavia.
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treated Istria as a substantially rebel and unreliable province, similarly to the 
way Slovenia was portrayed in Yugoslavia (Miš evi  2001; Šanti  2001). In this 
regard, slogans like “Zagreb=Belgrade” that appeared on the walls in Istria did 
not work for a general paci cation and stirred up HDZ nationalist passions, which 
were also in uenced by the leading Yugoslav representations that pictured Istria 
as a suspect territory, acquired by the former Kingdom of Italy and inhabited by a 
strong Italian minority. Thus, the idea that Istria was somehow ready to declare its 
independence, to search the union with Italy or, in the best of the cases, to declare 
a status that would transform it into a “Luxembourg of the Adriatic”, created real 
anxiety for the prosperity of Istrian economy compared to the rest of Croatia (Hedl 
2000).
Central to the incomprehension between the central government and the 
Istrian people was, and still is, a rather ambivalent and questionable notion of 
Istrian identity that can be summed up in the category of “Istria-ness” (Istrianità 
in Italian, Istrijanstvo in Croatian). That notion was explained and articulated 
differently, so that often the values attributed to the concept of “Istria-ness” are 
not so consistent and sometimes con ict. This is also an evidence of the high 
degree of subjectivity that permeates the topic, which, through the nineties, gained 
substantial currency within the political debate (Medica 1993; Ashbrook 2005, 
2006; D’Alessio 1998–1999; Ballinger 2003a; Kappus 2004). Among the copi-
ous opinions and descriptions of “Istria-ness”, I would quote three non-scholarly 
de nitions that I consider especially representative.
The  rst one is by the present leader of the IDS (Istarski demokratski sabor/
Istrian Democratic Assembly) Ivan Jakov i , that de ned “Istria-ness” as: “Some-
thing that maybe is less deep and strong than the national identity but does not 
exclude other dimensions […] the multiculturalism and pluri-lingualism of Istria 
that I experience everyday between Pazin and Pore , when I know exactly to 
whom to say: ‘Dobar dan’ or ‘Buon giorno’, to whom to say: ‘Dio’ or ‘Bog’” (De-
beljuh et al. 1995). The second belongs to another well known Istrian regionalist 
politician, Dino Debeljuh who said, with reference to the  rst census after the 
independence: “Then I felt that ‘Istria-ness’ was somewhat more authentic than 
the national belonging. I never thought that with this declaration I would have in 
some way denied my Croat-ness or any other dimension of my identity” (Debeljuh, 
Radin and Jakov i  1995). The third de nition has been given by Guido Miglia, 
one of the famous “voices” of the Italians exiled from Istria (Esuli), that after 
the  rst large victory of the IDS in 1992 said: “To go back to our genuine spirit, 
without prevarications or nationalist arrogance, carrying on from the two sides our 
‘Istria-ness’ that is the symbol of our brotherhood and that has always been broken 
by the ones who came from the outside to rule over us; without any understanding, 
dividing a body that the nature has always united in the small peninsula closed by 
the same sea” (Dormuth-Tommasini 1993:246).
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In itself, none of the three de nitions appears particularly threatening for 
national unity or anti-patriotic, nonetheless, the large part of Croatian political 
class reacted negatively to such statements. Not surprisingly, throughout the nine-
ties the ruling political elite of the HDZ has intensively contrasted the regionalist 
feelings “made in Istria” and frequently engaged several political battles with the 
IDS (such as the one around the constitutionality of the “statute of the region”).3 
However, after 2000, even some representatives of the winning center-left coali-
tion – and IDS was part of that coalition – were very critical towards “Istria-ness” 
and its main cultural and linguistic implication: bilingualism. For instance, the 
leader of the Social Liberal Party (HSLS), Dražen Budiša, was quite harsh and 
said: “We should not and we cannot tolerate the de-Croatisation of Istria. Istria has 
to go back to normality and all together we have to say: stop it!”4 In this perspec-
tive, the hidden fear was that the politics of de-militarization and bilingualism 
would implicitly prepare the assignment of Istria to Italy (Šanti  1995), even if 
there were also dissident voices against such assumptions, like that of Nela Rubi , 
who judged positively linguistic plurality in Istria.5
Accordingly, the researches carried out by Boris Banovac show that the cate-
gory of “Istria-ness” reveals a special attachment to the place, to the local reality, 
and does not imply identi cation with the state or the nation as a whole, that 
however is not denied (Banovac 1998). On the same wavelength are Petar Janko 
(1997) and Fulvio Šuran (1993) that maintain the existence of a well developed 
regional identity as territorial belonging and local patriotism, which are not hostile 
to national identity or any other coexistent process of identi cation because every 
single dimension of identity could grow or disappear from time to time depending 
on a number of causes.
Nevertheless, there are different opinions on this topic and some important 
voices criticized the unacceptable weakness of the national dimension of identity 
within the “Istria-ness”. Especially Petar Str i  and Nevio Šeti  openly attacked 
the idea of “Istria-ness” as regional belonging and territorial identi cation because 
of political exploitation of the concept made by the IDS, the regionalist party of 
Istria. In their opinion, even though a feeling of “Istria-ness” exists for speci c 
historical reasons, this dimension should not be politically relevant and in no case 
subordinate to the national one. According to Str i , the politicization of “Istria-
ness” would only be the result of a long term and deeply rooted strategy of the local 
elite to secure economic and political privileges through regional control of media 
and the overwhelming power of the local ruling party (Str i  1966–1969; 1991). 
3 Articles 8 and 11 of the statute, stating “multi-lingualism” of Istria and “recognising the 
value of Istria-ness” were reported to the Constitutional Court of Croatia, which declared them not 
admissible.
4 Feral Tribune, June 19, 2001.
5 Feral Tribune, June 16, 2001.
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Differently, Šeti  underlines the ethnic af nities between Istrian Croats and other 
Croats, explaining the persistence of regional frames in terms of the historically 
damaging in uence of the Italian bourgeoisie and of the Yugoslav ideologies that 
suffocated the national dimension in Istria (Šeti  1995). Also, criticisms against 
the Istrian regionalist populism are maintained by An elko Milardovi  (1995) and 
coloured with anti-colonial rhetoric by Duško Ve erina (2001).
However, from a political perspective, the regional identi cation in Istria does 
not necessarily exclude the Croatian national identity and gives raise to a well 
de ned electoral behaviour that is generally oriented towards quite abstract ex-
pectations of autonomy, paci sm and “Europeanisation”. The 1998 investigation 
into electoral behaviour in Istria, carried out by Neven Šanti  somehow proves the 
foregone (Šanti  2001). 813 voters from Istria have been questioned on the ideal 
institutional condition for the region Istria and on some political ideas:
Table 1: Percentage of agreement on some political ideas
Do you agree with: Yes No I don’t know Not answering
The idea of Istria as a 
Trans-border region?
54% 14,88% 28,89% 2,23%
The idea of a de-militari-
sation of Istria?
45,02% 24,48% 29,27% 1,23%
The idea of a participa-
tion of Istria at the coun-
cil of the Euro-region?
69,99% 8% 21,03% 0,98%
Source: Šanti  2001.
Table 2: Percentage of agreement on institutional perspectives for Istria
The ideal institutional condi-
tion for Istria
Frequency %
A region in Croatia 559 68,76%
Regional autonomy in Croatia 157 19,31%
Federal unit in Croatia 33 4,06%
Other 18 2,21%
Not answering 46 5,66%
Total 813 100%
Source: Šanti  2001.
In other words, it seems that the support given to the IDS depends on the electorate’s 
will of preservation and protection of the speci c social, cultural and economic 
features of the border region. From this point of view, the progressive values of 
the Western democracy are opposed to the military hostility and the violent ethnic 
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politics of the former Yugoslavia, which are perceived as detrimental to the local 
context of hybridism. Here, the myth of the imperial frontier acts as a powerful 
imaginary tool for the Istrian consciousness, reinforcing the conviction that Istria 
is a unique place for its bright past of the imperial crossroad. And, for this reason, 
it is nowadays endangered by the growing nationalist passions often imported 
from the outside. Here are some opinions I selected from the interviews I had with 
local political leaders and exponents of the cultural milieu during my  eldwork in 
Istria.6 They are trying to explain why Istria is so “special” and “unique”:
[…] because here is the only place where Germans, Latins and Slavs have met… 
only here! From Klagenfurt to Trieste, from Udine to Rijeka … here you have the 
encounter! (43, 2000, Buje).
[…] because these are mixed lands and Italians and Croats lived side by side in 
the same villages, Slovenes and Croats, Slovenes, Croats and Italians … then also 
Austrians, very much since the last century. And you can  nd now someone called 
Kramsteter that is a Deputy Mayor in Buje, a Luttemberger in Opatija, Obersner 
in Rijeka… half-Italians, half-Croats, even Austrians… absolutely (62, 2000, 
Rovinj).
[…] you cannot come every thirty-forty years, changing the shape of the state and 
accusing the people of being like this or like that without knowing how things were 
before. There is a nice de nition for Istria: “Every present ruler is the liberator and 
the former one the oppressor” (75, 2001, Pula).
There is a historical fact about a Venetian ship coming back from the Holy Land 
that was attacked by the pirates, in Dalmatia. The Doge, who was on board, was 
killed and his body massacred. Tu man, in 1993 has organized a commission of 
historians for deciding the day of the newly established Croatian Navy […] and the 
one of the massacre of the Doge was the date he chose! The day of the Navy is the 
day of the criminals! He chose a neighbouring country, Italy, and an anti-Italian 
date, because for him Venice was Italy. Also, he organized an international commi-
ssion aimed at demonstrating that Marco Polo was a Croat: international because 
there was one British historian, who even did not agree with the thesis but as the 
others were positive on it, from that day Marco Polo became “Marko Polo”. And 
now this is the name of a train and of a ferry […] But the truth is that Venice has 
also protected the coastal cities from the attacks of these pirates, but the of cial 
history in Croatia is silent on it, especially in schoolbooks. Istria has never identi-
 ed itself with such culture also because of the constant in uence of foreign media, 
especially Italian, that have given a different view of things. We wanted to be closer 
to Europe (79, 2001, Opatija).
[…] Istria has a speci c historical experience, it has always been a separate admi-
nistrative reality, from Venice onwards. States pass by but Istria remains, in spite of 
external changes (31, 2000, Pula).
6 The age of informants, the year and the place of the interviews are reported within brackets. 
Interviews were held in Croatian or Italian, translations are mine.
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Within the imperial narrative, a prominent place is occupied by the Austro-Hun-
garian period, which often emerges in the collective memory as the “golden pe-
riod” for Istria, somewhat resembling the Habsburg nostalgia in Trieste (Ballinger 
2003b). Here, there is a striking difference from the Croatian nationalist approach, 
where the memory of Austria reinforced the ethnic and religious identity on the 
base of the historical collective sacri ce that saved the Western world. In the case 
of Istria, the legacy of Austria is mainly interpreted in terms of social tolerance, 
administrative ef ciency and institutional independence for the Istrian county. 
The same origin of the organism of the “Diet”, the regional assembly that gives 
the name to the IDS goes back to the Austrian times. Here are again some opinions 
I collected in the  eld over this speci c topic:
This representation, I think comes from the times of the Austrian empire,  rst of 
all. When Istria, Trieste and Rijeka were part of the same Austrian maritime littoral. 
Because Venice has a strong in uence but only on the coast. At that time, Istria 
without Rijeka had its regional assembly, its “Diet” in Vienna. And these admi-
nistrative borders between Muggia and Trieste, until Preluka, just before Rijeka, 
they go back to Austria, they are still the borders of Istria: everybody knows it and 
agrees upon it (57, 2001, Pazin).
In Istria, after Austria, some have had some bad experiences with Italy, many with 
Yugoslavia. The political change is always seen as a very dangerous thing (43, 
2000, Buje).
The Austro-Hungarian Empire has really been a golden period: the nationalities 
were cooperating and promoted a better life quality in general. Here in Pazin there 
were two cultural elites, two schools, and two reading societies: Vienna  nanced 
the Croatian school and Rome the Italian one (68, 2001, Pazin).
Well, at the time when Austria ruled, we must confess, and now people agree, that 
the situation was far better. A few years ago there were people alive, who still re-
membered Austria and they said that there was an impressive order, impossible to 
imagine today, that everything was working properly… However, I think that this 
is also a myth, a myth that Croatia uses against Italy, against Venice, saying that we 
were Austrians, we were  ghting on the same side (79, 2001, Opatija).
[…] a unity that maybe never existed politically but it is mostly cultural and econo-
mic. But at the time of the Austro-Hungarian empire such unity existed and it was 
probably the best period, recalled by many of us with nostalgia (36, 2000, Pula).
As we were speaking [refers to a discussion with the grandfather, E. C.], I asked 
him: “When it was better? Under Italian sovereignty, now…”. And you know what 
this old man told me? – “It was better under Austria”. “How come?”, I say. And he 
says: “Let me explain: when the train arrived in Pazin, at the time of Austria, the 
driver of the train used to come out and say: Pisino, Vortenburg7 (sic!), Pazin. Now, 
7 This is actually Mitterburg.
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who says it anymore? We, in this place, since that time we keep on saying it in three 
languages! That was Austria” (41, 2000, Koper).
The “Yugo-nostalgia” exists exactly as an “Austro-nostalgia”, in the sense that 
people say that it was better before and that, for example, “With Austria this would 
have never happened!”, “The Austrians! They would have never allowed it!” Re-
ferring to… I don’t know… the new name given by the Croatian state to a street, 
a place or similar things. This is because bureaucracy was better and everyone has 
his stories about small villages having their rights recognized by the Empire. Small 
places that became administrative centers during the Austrian Empire and nurture 
pride about that period (36, 2001, Pore ).
Good Citizens or Bad Croats?
It is my belief that the con ict between regionalism and nationalism in Croatia 
after 1990 has been fuelled by the political use of ethnicity at the state level, 
which aimed at reaching integral political consent through cultural homogeniza-
tion. At the central level, the rule of the  rst President Franjo Tu man inspired 
an original political discourse (also known as “Tu manism”) that was imbued 
with anti-communist feelings and historical revisionism (Mac Donald 2000). In 
the meanwhile, as Alex Bellamy notices, Tu man’s deep conviction was that na-
tional sovereignty could be obtained only through national unity (Bellamy 2000). 
Thus, throughout the nineties, the peculiar blend of patriotism, authoritarian rule 
and ethnic exclusivist practices expressed a deep bond between the HDZ and the 
Croatian State, which were sometimes hard to disentangle (Uzelak 1998).
In this perspective, independence and national sovereignty represented the real 
common good and this belief is re ected in the big project of national reconcili-
ation [pomirba] among all the Croats in the world. For the purpose to reconcile 
de nitely communists and anti-communists, Tu man often declared to be the 
president of all the Croats, meaning that every extreme position of Croatian politics 
has to fall within his realm (Kearns 1996). Accordingly, the role of the HDZ was 
conceived to defend and guarantee the unity of the nation as a prerequisite for the 
state sovereignty and independence. Then, all positions expressed in the Croatian 
political tradition were uni ed in the common  ght for Croatian sovereignty be-
cause, in any case, the HDZ would have pursued the national interest and should 
not have been subject to criticism. Consequently, even after the achievement of 
independence and sovereignty, these goals remained the only substantial interest 
of the HDZ (Bellamy 2000:6).
However, the process of reconciliation and homogenization of Croatian society 
was not an easy task and the “Tu manism” brought about many problems of social 
discrimination and potential deterioration of the young Croatian democracy (Co-
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hen 1997; Grdeši  1999). The HDZ extended largely its in uence on the political 
scene and labeled every form of opposition like national treason or dangerous act 
for the State’s stability (Goldstein 1999:258–260). The use of ethnicity as an index 
of political loyalty introduced implicitly a scale of purity so that a stronger or a 
weaker “Croat-ness” in uenced directly the relation of citizenship and promoted 
a process of social fragmentation among the citizens of the new Croatian state, 
who partly became objects of politics of ethnic suspect: a strategy that the HDZ 
considered a necessary safety measure against subjects potentially hostile to the 
national cause (Ashbrook 2005:329). On the contrary, a proved ethnic and cultural 
integrity was appreciated like a prerequisite for political “normality”, that is to 
say for the complete acceptance of the power structure presided by Tu man and 
for the consequent inclusion in the institutional apparatus. Therefore, the relation 
of citizenship, which linked the Croatian citizens to their State, was essentially 
compromised by ethnicity; the latter was not only functional to consent but served 
as a political tool to delegitimize all possible political adversaries, pictured as 
“bad Croats”.
An example of such ethnic distortion of the citizenship bond is given by the 
role played by the “Herzegovinians”, citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina of Croa-
tian ethnicity, in the political and economic life of Croatia (Thompson 1999:269). 
They were known both for their fervent nationalism, frequently intermingled with 
religious arguments, and for the involvement of their “lobby” in many illicit activi-
ties. In the nineties, many Herzegovinians joined massively the local HDZ and for 
Tu man they were indeed the best Croats, that is to say an example of patriotism 
for all the others in spite of their being Bosnian-Herzegovinian and not Croatian 
citizens (Bellamy 2000:13; Tanner 1997:285–286). Once, during a rally in the 
city of Mostar, in present day Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tu man clearly illustrated 
the concept by saying that: “You Herzegovinians are the model for all the others 
in Croatia under many points of view” (Lovri  1997), connecting implicitly their 
alleged “Croat-ness”, their pure ethnicity, to the loyalty to the HDZ, once again 
pictured as the metaphor for the nation.
Therefore, in order to legitimize the function of “Croat-ness” for the achieve-
ment of their political goal, Tu man and his party fellows usually referred to the 
“righteous” nature of the “Homeland war” and of their “state building project”. 
However, the ethnic politics that privileged the “Great Croats” of the diasporas 
also increased a sense of insecurity, which had a territorial projection. In other 
words, the state sponsored nationalist discourse eventually strengthened the re-
gional differentiation that emerged in the public sphere after the work of some 
local elites, already in the eighties. In Istria, literary works such as La miglior 
vita by Fulvio Tomizza (1981) and Riva i druzi. Ili, caco su nassa dizza by Milan 
Rakovac (1981) introduced to the public sphere themes like the many linguistic 
varieties of the region and the dialects as everyday means of expression of Istria; 
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the sufferance brought by external powers and their struggle for an ideological 
purpose; frequent human mobility, border changes and the hybrid identity of the 
Istrians.
Certainly, during the nineties, all over Central and Eastern Europe, the ambi-
tions of minority groups stirred up the majority’s consciousness and increased 
the general atmosphere of suspicion. A quite widespread fear was that the call 
for protection of collective cultural or linguistic rights would have represented a 
 rst step towards secession or annexation of the territory by a neighbouring state 
(Schöp in 1994:129). Conversely, the lack of cultural rights could have irritated 
the minority group and eventually could have enhanced the possibilities of radical 
factions. This process has been signi cantly de ned as “balkanization” (Bugajski 
1994), that is to say the degeneration of mutual trust between a majority and mi-
nority group, which would eventually turn calls for cultural protection and local 
self-goverment into secession movements. In spite of a more stable geopolitical 
context and a signi cant enlargement of the EU in the region, such processes are 
far from being stopped. On the contrary, they keep on putting forward challenges 
well beyond the Central and Eastern European realm.
In our case, the advocates of Croatian nationalism wanted to solve the dis-
crepancies between citizenship and nationality through a process of progressive 
cultural homogenization of the state territory. In this perspective, a major role 
has been played by the representation of the Serbo-Croatian war (1991–1995) 
not only and legitimately as a “Homeland war” [Domovinski rat], but also as a 
“righteous” war: a war against an Eastern barbarian aggressor in defense of Eu-
ropean values and af liations. Here, intellectual and politicians publicly used and 
often manipulated the stories of the old struggle between the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire and the Ottoman one, the memories of the military border [Vojna krajina]
and the chronicles of the Venetian almost colonial domination of the Adriatic. 
As a result, the national reconciliation process [pomirba] worked out viciously 
and being Croatian coincided with being nationally (ethnic) Croat and eventually 
HDZ sympathizer. In addition, the practices of privatization and the privileges 
often granted by the State to the members of the “loyalist” Croatian diasporas – 
the “good Croats” – cast a doubt on the equality of treatment of Croatian citizens 
(Petri i  2000).
At the same time, the supporters of regionalism in Istria – the “bad Croats” – 
have reacted to such a homogenizing project pursuing a different and somehow 
opposite strategy, that can be described in terms of a clear separation between 
nationality and citizenship. According to this, the regionalism aims, on the one 
hand, at considering nationality as a private and non-political choice; on the 
other one, at establishing a strict connection between the individual af liation 
to the regional frontier territory and the possession of citizenship rights. In other 
words, for many Istrians while one’s nationality could change, there would be a 
permanent pattern of identi cation, namely the local identi cation with the terri-
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tory. This identi cation, synthesized by the concept of “Istria-ness” [istrijanstvo] 
would mean the multi-ethnic and multi-national sense of belonging to the territory 
of a frontier region, beyond state borders – as it is speci ed in the statute of the 
regional administrative body.
The nature of such borderland identity, even though quite diverse in its con-
tents as everyone gives a different version of it, reveals a clear function though: 
the personal search for protection and even physical survival during a danger-
ous transition process that was taking place in an area where state identity is 
frequently subject to changes and nationality is often a matter of discrimination. 
So, a mimetic identi cation has been carried out on very subjective bases, but 
neither with an ethno-national group nor with a state. I am aware that diverse, 
noteworthy and sometimes contrasting scholarly interpretations of Istria-ness 
have been produced in the last years. According to some of them, like that by 
Pamela Ballinger, Istria-ness would portray a paradoxical authentic hybridity 
(Ballinger 2003a:245–265), which would nonetheless convey symbols and nar-
ratives produced by nation states. As a result, behind the rhetoric of coexistence, 
the “authentic” Istrian regional identity would provide with cultural foundation a 
territorial divide between Istria and the Balkan “otherness”, thus suggesting some 
asymmetries of “civilization” and enacting a type of “orientalism” (Bakic-Hayden 
1992; Baskar 2002). Others, such as John E. Ashbrook, take a sort of rational 
choice perspective and suggest the economic factor played the main role in the 
nineties, as people voted the IDS to try to remedy the economic problems of the 
region, even envisaging a Western intervention vis-à-vis the growing monopoly 
of the state (Ashbrook 2005:330–332). I am not saying these analyses are missing 
the point while discussing Istria-ness, but I still think they tend to underestimate 
the everyday life experience of a frontier region, where the same idea of rational 
actor and state-building is  ltered by the “struggle” for survival, mimicry and 
ambivalent games.
In fact, in my opinion, it is the “territory” of the region itself, which provides 
the base for solving the vicious con ict between nationality and citizenship, 
transforming eventually the Istrians into “good citizens”. A territory, which the 
regionalist narratives, largely playing upon romantic interpretations of imperial 
legacies, depict as a historical unity, which Venetian commercial power and the 
Habsburg ef cient public administration forged with local cosmopolitanism and 
tolerance. A micro-world that the national and cultural antagonisms constantly 
threaten and therefore, it must be protected: independently from exclusivist prac-
tices towards the Balkan neighbours or instrumental decision to maximize the 
economic bene ts. These aspects are also part of the story but are probably less 
crucial than one could possibly expect.
Even today, I would not be surprised if many people in Istria would rather 
consider nationality as subjective strategy to achieve social empowerment at the 
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local level than a matter of political loyalty to a state. Appealing to the frequent 
sovereignty changes that the region underwent in recent history, the inhabitants of 
Istria would be probably ready to support all practices of citizenship that promote 
their social and economic safety, independently from nationality but not necessar-
ily against it.
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POGRANI NA MIMIKRIJA: CARSKA NASLJE A, NACIONALNA 
STAJALIŠTA I REGIONALNI IDENTITET U HRVATSKOJ ISTRI 
NAKON 1990-IH
SAŽETAK
Carska naslje a imaju dvostruku prirodu: mogu se iskoristiti za podupiranje etno-nacionalne iden-
ti kacije, ali i za naglašavanje lokalno utemeljenih narativa o hibridnim identitetima i višestrukim 
pripadnostima. Temeljna je pretpostavka da ta dvostruka priroda carskih naslje a nastaje u kontek-
stu problemati nih odnosa izme u koncepcija nacionalnosti i državljanstva. Hipoteza je ispitana u 
kontekstu aktiviranja diskursa carskog naslje a na lokalnoj razini – u hrvatskoj Istri 1990-ih – kada 
su iskorišteni kao protu-pri e društvenoj i kulturnoj homogenizaciji, koju je propagirala hrvatska 
vlada. Pristalice regionalizma u Istri reagirali su na projekt državnog homogeniziranja provode i 
druk iju i unekoliko suprotnu strategiju, koja se može opisati u terminima jasnog razdvajanja izme u 
nacionalnosti i državljanstva. Njihov je regionalizam ciljao, s jedne strane, na promatranje nacional-
nosti kao privatnog a ne politi kog izbora, a, s druge strane, na uspostavljanje precizne veze izme u 
pojedina ne pripadnosti regionalnom pograni nom teritoriju i pravu na državljanstvo. Drugim 
rije ima, za mnoge Istrane ne ija se nacionalnost mogla promijeniti, ali je postojao nepromjenjiv 
obrazac identi kacije s lokalnim podru jem. Ta identi kacija, koju sintetizira pojam “istrijanstvo” 
[Istria-ness], podrazumijeva multietni ki i multinacionalni osje aj pripadnosti pograni noj regiji 
onkraj državnih granica. Priroda toga pograni nog identiteta, iako prili no razli ita u svom sadržaju 
jer mu svi pridaju razli ita tuma enja, ipak otkriva svoju jasnu funkciju: osobnu potragu za zaštitom, 
pa ak i  zi kim opstankom u opasnom procesu tranzicije koja se odvijala na podru ju gdje se državni 
identitet esto mijenjao i nacionalnost je esto bila predmetom diskriminacije. Dakle, mimeti ka je 
identi kacija provedena na vrlo subjektivnoj osnovi, ali niti s etno-nacionalnom skupinom niti s 
državom.
Klju ne rije i: Istra, granica, politi ki identiteti, carska naslje a
